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This paper examines credit risk in the European automotive industry. 
Distance to Default (DD) is calculated using the Merton structural 
credit model. In addition, we modify the Merton model to generate an 
innovative measure of credit risk at the extremes of the asset value 
fluctuations distribution, which we call Conditional Distance to Default 
(CDD). The credit risk of all listed automotive stocks on the S&P Euro 
Index is compared to all the other industries on this index, which 
comprises 180 stocks with geographic and sectoral diversity. The 
study spans the 10 years from 2000 to 2009 divided into pre-GFC and 
GFC periods. Our metrics find the automotive industry to be of high 
risk relative to other European industries, particularly during the GFC. 
We also find that our CDD metric is better able to capture the extreme 
credit risk prevalent in the industry during the GFC than traditional DD 
metrics.   
 
Field of Research: Banking 
 
JEL Codes:  G01 and G21 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The extreme financial market volatility and severe bank stresses of the GFC 
highlighted the importance of understanding and measuring extreme credit risk. 
Understanding default risk in an industry is crucial to lenders in setting policies such 
as credit concentration limits, pricing, capital allocation and lending officers’ loan 
approval authority limits for that industry.  
 
To measure credit risk we use the structural credit model of Merton (1974) and KMV 
(Crosbie & Bohn, 2003) which incorporates a combination of fluctuations in market 
asset values and the debt / equity structure of the borrower’s  balance sheet to 
measure DD. Most prevailing credit models measure credit risk based on averages 
or standard deviations (including the Merton model) over time or in the case of Value 
at Risk (VaR), below a specified threshold. However credit losses are usually not 
normally distributed, and the problem with these approaches is that they do not cater 
for risk measurement at the extreme end of the scale, which is when firms are most 
likely to fail. We thus modify the Merton model to incorporate an extreme risk 
measurement which we call Conditional Distance to Default (CDD). This is our 
unique metric which measures credit risk above a selected threshold, in a similar 
vein to which Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) is used to measure extreme 
insurance and market risk. These metrics are explained in Section 3.3. The 
conditional metrics have been used to examine industry risk in Europe (Allen, Powell, 
& Singh, 2011), but not in the automotive industry, making this study a first. The 
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question explored by this study is the extent to which the automotive industry is  
more (less) risky than other European industries from a credit perspective using both 
traditional DD credit metrics as well as CDD measures of extreme risk. To ascertain 
this relative risk we compare the automotive industry to a range of other industries.  
We also examine whether the relative risk of the automotive industry changed during 
the extreme conditions of the GFC as compared to pre-GFC. 
 
The study finds the automotive industry to be among the riskiest of the industries 
examined pre-GFC and that this relative risk increases even further during the GFC.  
This means that it is important for lenders wishing to minimize extreme risk to take 
care when lending to the automotive industry in volatile circumstances and to ensure 
sufficient provisions and capital to counter this risk. 
     
As background, Section 2 provides an overview of the automotive industry, with a 
particular focus on Europe.  Data and Methodology are discussed in Section 3, 
followed by results in Section 4 and conclusions in Section 5. 
 
2. Background and Literature Review 
 
Europe’s largest 6 car manufacturers have total assets of over €700bn with sales in 
2011 of close to €700bn. Volkswagen (including Audi, Bentley, Bugatti, Lamborghini, 
Porsche, Scania and Skoda) is the largest manufacturer with a market share of 
around 20%, followed by Daimler (including Mercedes Benz), BMW (including Mini 
as well as being the outsourced manufacturer of Rolls Royce vehicles), Fiat 
(including Ferrari and Alpha Romeo), Renault and Peugeot (including Citroen). Other 
key players in the European market are Ford with a market share of around 10% and 
Asian car manufacturers (15%). 
 
Figure 1: European Car Manufacturers: Assets and Sales 
Source: Datastream 
 
Sales have shrunk over the ten years to 2012 at an average of approximately 1% per 
annum. 
  
Globally, the new car market suffered severe problems during the GFC with General 
Motors and Chrysler filing for bankruptcy in 2008, and many other manufacturers, 
including one of the world’s largest car manufacturers Toyota, posting losses in 
2009. This led to many manufacturers downsizing their operations. In Europe, 
Volkswagen and BMW experienced significant profit reductions in 2009, with 
Daimler, Fiat, Renault and Peugeot all experiencing losses. Along with global trends, 
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share prices in the European car market plunged 70% from its peak in 2007 to its 
trough in 2008. Globally, including Europe, the automotive industry was beset by 
downsizing, job losses and restructuring. GM sold Saab to Dutch manufacturer 
Spyker cars and closed Hummer. Ford sold Jaguar and Landrover to India’s Tata 
and Volvo to China’s Geely. The European company to buck the poor profitability 
trend during the crisis was Porsche, who maintained strong sales and profits over the 
GFC period. In 2007 and 2008 Porsche increased its stake in Volkswagen, giving it 
effective control over Volkswagen. However, in 2009 Porsche and Volkswagen 
agreed to form a Volkswagen led ‘integrated automotive group’ merger. 
 
There are some key reasons why the new motor vehicle industry is particularly 
susceptible to economic downturns. Job losses cause reductions in discretionary 
purchases. Even employed consumers often put larger purchases such as vehicles 
on hold during difficult economic times. Sales are also highly reliant on motor vehicle 
finance being provided to purchasers. This latter issue was particularly prevalent 
during the GFC when the credit crunch following the sub-prime problems made it 
very difficult to obtain motor vehicle finance. A US  congressional investigation 
(Cannis & Yacobucci, 2010) into the industry’s performance during the GFC found 
that the global economy was already slowing prior to the GFC and consumers had 
been cutting back on their vehicle purchases even before the credit crunch began.   
The fear of unemployment during the GFC, coupled with rising fuel prices 
exacerbated these problems. When automakers started experiencing major 
problems they then it found it almost impossible to raise further finance to keep their 
companies afloat.  
  
Blair and Freedman (2010) examine problems in the industry going back to the 
seventies and maintain that most of the problems arise from car manufacturers 
gearing their strategies to a particular business environment, as though that 
environment will continue indefinitely, and have no flexibility to change their strategy 
when the environment changes. Regassa and Ahmadian (2007) discuss the 
difficulties that inroads made by Asian car manufacturers have caused the US and 
European manufacturers, with the Asian firms having been successful at matching 
quality and price expectations of consumers. 
 
Other than the studies mentioned above, there are not many studies specifically 
relating to credit risk in the European automotive industry. We provide some 
examples here of some more general studies on credit risk in Europe. A Bank of 
England study (Tudela & Young, 2003) found the probability of default derived from 
their Merton-model implementation for UK firms provides a strong signal of failure 
one year in advance of its occurrence. Geroski and Gregg (1997) find debt-to-assets 
ratio, employment, and certain profit measures to be significant determinants 
company default in the United Kingdom. Allen, Powell and Singh (2011), using a 
wide range of risk measures, found that European industries which were most (least) 
risky during the global financial crisis were not the same as those which were most 
(least) risky prior to the GFC. The authors found the Consumer Discretionary, 
Financials, Utilities and Energy industries showed more relative credit risk 
deterioration than other industries during the GFC. Bonfim (2009) finds that, though a 
firms’ financial situation has a central role in explaining default probabilities, 
macroeconomic conditions are also very important when assessing default 
probabilities over time. Goddard, Molyneux, & Wilson (2009) find that under the 
regulatory framework in Europe that is being shaped in response to the crisis, banks 
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are expected to become leaner, more strongly capitalised and less highly leveraged, 
and to develop improved risk management practices. None of the abovementioned 
prior studies, nor any other studies we are aware of, focus specifically on default risk 
in the European automotive industry, particularly using the metrics we use in this 
article, making this study unique. 
 
Credit ratings applicable to European automotive companies are shown in Table 1. 
As mentioned in Section 3.3, credit ratings do not ratchet up or down with changing 
economic circumstances and remained fairly static over this period.  
 
Table 1: European Car Manufacturers: Credit ratings 
Credit ratings are by Moody’s Investment Company at 2006 and 2009. A rating of A1 is broadly equivalent to 
Standard and Poor’s A+, A2 to A, A3 to A-, Baa1 to BBB+, Ba1 to BB+ and Ba3 to BB-. 
 
Company Pre-GFC (2006) GFC (2009) 
BMW A1 A2 
Daimler Baa1 A3 
Fiat Ba3 Ba1 
Peugeot Ba1 Ba1 
Renault Ba1 Ba1 
Volkswagen A3 A3 
 
Despite the losses and problems mentioned earlier, only one company (BMW) shows 
a downgrade over this period. Neither of the two companies which were bailed out by 
the French government (Peugeot and Renault as mentioned in Section 4) received 
any rating change since 2006, when their credit rating of Baa1 had an associated 
probability of default (PD) of less than 0.0001%. Indeed, the aggregate Moody’s PD 
risk associated with the above six companies based on their ratings at 2009 was less 
than 1%. On the other hand, our CDD measure of 0.87 during the GFC shown in the 
results section of this paper has an associated Conditional PD (CPD) exceeding 20% 
per equations 4 and 5. This is because the DD and CDD models used in this paper 
are based on daily asset fluctuations and therefore respond far more rapidly to 
changing economic circumstances than credit ratings. The higher PD shown by the 
CDD model seems much more consistent than the static ratings with the fact that the 
industry as a whole suffered losses and downsizing and two out of six automotive 
companies needed to be bailed out.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
 
The study includes all listed automotive stocks on the S&P Euro index, which is all 
the major six European vehicle manufacturing companies. We compare the 
automotive industry to all other industries in this index, which comprises 180 stocks 
with geographic and sectoral diversity, and a total market cap of €2.3 trillion. 
Industries are classified according to the Global Industry Classification System 
(GICS). We obtain 10 years of daily returns from Datastream, divided into pre-GFC 
and GFC periods. The pre-GFC period is the 7 years prior to 2007. 7 years aligns 
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with Basel Accord advanced model requirements for measuring credit risk. The GFC 
period includes the 3 years from 2007 – 2009. We do not include data later than this 
as the market improved from 2010 onwards, and inclusion of this would defeat the 
object of isolating the extreme risk during the GFC. The Merton KMV model requires 
balance sheet data for each entity (equity and debt) which we also obtain from 
Datastream. Descriptive statistics of our data sample are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
The table provides a sector breakdown of the S&PEuro index used in this study. The market leader 
shown in the final column is based on market cap. 
 
Sector
Number of 
Companies
Total Sector 
Market Cap 
(€bn)
Average 
Market Cap. 
(€bn)
Market  Cap. 
of Largest 
Company in 
Sector (€bn) Market Leader
Automotive 6 134                  22.34               74                     Volkswagen
Consumer discretionary 21 68                     3.23                 24                     LVMH
Consumer staples 15 205                  13.69               48                     Unilever
Energy 7 187                  26.77               87                     Total
Financials 38 484                  12.72               54                     Banco Santander
Health care 9 130                  14.47               59                     Sanofi-Aventis
Industrials 30 236                  7.86                 57                     Siemens
Information technology 8 95                     11.84               41                     Nokia
Materials 18 144                  8.01                 25                     BASF
Telecommunication services 9 229                  25.41               73                     Telefonica
Utilities 16 375                  23.47               76                     EDF
Total S&P Euro 177 2,287               12.92               87                     Total  
   
                                                   
3.2 Hypotheses 
 
In line with our research questions outlined in section 1, we formulate the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H1: Credit risk of the automotive industry, as measured by DD, deteriorated relative 
to other industries during the GFC as compared to pre-GFC. 
 
H2: Credit risk of the automotive industry, as measured by CDD ranking, deteriorated 
relative to other industries during the GFC as compared to pre-GFC. 
 
We will measure absolute DD and CDD values as well as ranking the credit risk of 
the automobile industry relative to other industries. 
 
3.3 Credit Risk Measurement 
 
The Merton / KMV structural approach to estimating distance to default (DD) and 
probability of default (PD) is used. The KMV model is one of the most widely used 
credit risk models in the banking industry.  The structural model holds that there are 
3 key determinants of default: the asset values of a firm, the risk of fluctuations in 
those asset values, and the leverage (the extent to which the assets are funded by 
borrowings as opposed to equity). The firm defaults when debt exceeds assets. DD 
and PD are measured as follows: 
 
Allen, Kramadibrata, Powell
 
& Singh 
27 
 
T
TFV
DD
V
V

 )5.0()/ln( 2

       (1) 
 
DD)N(PD           (2) 
 
Where V is the firm’s market value, F is the face value of firm’s debt, σv is the 
standard deviation of market asset returns over period T (which we set to 1 year per 
usual practice), and µ is an estimate of annual return (drift) of the firm’s assets. 
 
Market value of assets is obtained using the approaches outlined by KMV (Crosbie & 
Bohn, 2003) and Bharath & Shumway (2008).  Initial asset returns (for every day) in 
our data set are estimated from daily equity returns data (obtained from Datastream) 
using the following formula, where E is the market capitalization of the firm: 
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        (3) 
 
The daily log return is calculated and new asset values estimated every day following 
the KMV iteration and convergence procedure. We measure µ as the mean of the 
change  in lnV as per Vassalou & Xing (2004). Following KMV, we define debt as 
current liabilities plus half of long term liabilities. 
 
A key advantage that the structural model has over other prevailing models is that it 
incorporates fluctuating asset values thus enabling the model to respond rapidly to 
changing economic circumstances, whereas most other credit models are based on 
accounting or ratings methods which do not automatically ratchet up or down when 
circumstances change. The importance of fluctuating asset values in measuring 
credit risk has been raised by the Bank of England (2008), who make makes the 
point that not only do asset values fall in times of uncertainty, but rising probabilities 
of default make it more likely that assets will have to be liquidated at market values. 
Examples of studies using structural methodology for varying aspects of credit risk 
include asset correlation (Cespedes, 2002; Kealhofer & Bohn, 1993; Lopez, 2004; 
Vasicek, 1987; Zeng & Zhang, 2001), predictive value and validation (Bharath & 
Shumway, 2008; Stein, 2007), fixed income modelling (D'Vari, Yalamanchili, & Bai, 
2003), and effect of default risk on equity returns  (Chan, Faff, & Kofman, 2008; 
Gharghori, Chan, & Faff, 2007; Vassalou & Xing, 2004) and quantile regression 
(Allen, Boffey, & Powell, 2011). 
   
Besides fluctuating assets, the other key component of structural modelling is the 
borrower’s leverage ratio. Excessive leverage ratios by many companies, most 
notably banks and motor vehicle manufacturers, led to many requiring additional 
capitalisation during the GFC. The equity ratios for automotive companies in this 
study range from 40.6% (BMW) to 64.0% (Fiat). 
 
A shortfall of the Merton / KMV model is that it is based on the standard deviation of 
fluctuating assets over the period measured. This does not tell us how close the 
borrower came to default at the most extreme points of the period being measured. 
In the measurement of share market risk, Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) is 
becoming an increasingly popular risk measure as it measures risk at the extremes 
of the distribution, which is ignored by more traditional measures such as Value at 
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Risk (VaR). CVaR measures the average risk beyond a determined threshold, such 
as the average of the worst 5% of returns. 
   
In a similar vein, we have developed a credit risk measure called Conditional 
Distance to Default (CDD), which is defined as DD based on the worst 5% of asset 
returns. The standard deviation of the worst 5% (CStdev) is substituted into equation 
1 to obtain a conditional DD: 
 
             
TVCStdev
TVFVCDD
)
2
5.0()/ln(  
       (4) 
And 
 
  )( CDDNCPD          (5)  
 
4. Findings and Discussion 
 
Table 3: DD and CDD Results 
DD (measured by number of standard deviations) is calculated using equation 1. CDD is based on the worst 5% 
of asset returns and is calculated using equation 4. Pre-GFC incorporates the 7 years to 2006. GFC includes 
2007 – 2009. Rankings are from 1 (lowest risk) to 11 (highest risk).   
 
DD:
DD DD Rank Rank
Sector Pre GFC GFC Pre GFC GFC
Automotive 5.99 3.27 7 10
Consumer Disc. 6.15 3.48 5 9
Consumer Staples 6.88 5.30 3 2
Energy 6.82 3.98 4 7
Financials 6.00 2.77 6 11
Health Care 5.62 5.30 9 3
Industrials 6.94 4.19 2 4
IT 3.56 4.07 11 6
Materials 5.98 3.88 8 8
Telecomm. Services 5.20 6.32 10 1
Utilities 8.31 4.15 1 5
6.15 4.34
Motor Vehicles 1.44 0.85 7.00 10.00  
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CDD:
CDD CDD Rank Rank
Sector Pre GFC GFC Pre GFC GFC
Automotive 1.44 0.85 7 10
Consumer Disc. 1.45 0.86 6 9
Consumer Staples 1.62 1.31 4 2
Energy 1.81 0.87 2 8
Financials 1.31 0.65 9 11
Health Care 1.38 1.25 8 3
Industrials 1.65 1.09 3 4
IT 0.83 0.96 11 5
Materials 1.46 0.94 5 6
Telecomm. Services 1.20 1.48 10 1
Utilities 2.04 0.91 1 7
1.48 1.03  
 
Not unexpectedly, given the well known problems experienced by the Finance 
industry as a leading player during the GFC downturn, this industry is the highest risk 
during the GFC, with a strong downward shift in relative ranking from the pre-GFC 
period.  However, the automotive industry is not far behind, ranking 10 out of 11 
industries during the GFC in line with the automotive industry problems outlined in 
Section 2 (see Allen, Powell & Singh (2011) for industries excluding automotive, and 
for other risk metrics). Figure 2 illustrates differences between pre-GFC and GFC 
outcomes.  
 
Figure 2:  DD and CDD Values 
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The completely different pattern in solid and non-solid bars illustrates how relative 
risk has changed between the industries. This is certainly the case with the motor 
vehicle industry, dropping 3 rankings on both DD and CDD measurements. Some 
industries show a difference between DD and CDD rankings. For example Utilities 
have a GFC DD ranking of 5, but a CDD ranking of 7 meaning they have a relatively 
fatter left tail than the other industries. For the automotive industry, there is 
consistency between DD and CDD rankings.  However, both metrics drop 3 rankings 
during the GFC, a finding consistent with the studies mentioned in section 2, which 
showed the industry to be highly susceptible to problems in downturn times. Table 4 
presents a correlation analysis between DD/CCD and pre-GFC/GFC outcomes and 
tests for whether differences are significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Allen, Kramadibrata, Powell
 
& Singh 
31 
 
Table 4: Correlation – All Industries 
The upper table correlates pre-GFC rankings with GFC rankings for both DD (on the left of the table) and CDD 
(on the right).  The lower table correlates DD rankings with CDD rankings for both the pre-GFC (on the left of 
the table) and GFC (on the right).  Rankings are taken from Table 3 and range from 1 (lowest risk) to 11 (highest 
risk). A Spearman Rank Correlation Test is applied to determine correlation between the rankings. Significance 
in ranking correlation at the 95% level is denoted by * and at the 99% level by **, with a   ‘-‘   indicating no 
significance. 
 
 Correlation between pre-GFC and GFC 
DD Rank DD Rank Difference CDD Rank CDD Rank Difference 
Sector pre-GFC GFC in rank2 pre-GFC GFC in rank2
Automotive 7 10 9 7 10 9
Consumer Discretionary 5 9 16 6 9 1
Consumer Staples 3 2 1 4 2 4
Energy 4 7 9 2 8 36
Financials 6 11 25 9 11 4
Health Care 9 3 36 8 3 25
Industrials 2 4 4 3 4 1
IT 11 6 50 11 5 50
Materials 8 8 0 5 6 1
Telecomm. Services 10 1 81 10 1 81
Utilities 1 5 16 1 7 36
247 248
n 11 11
r -0.123 -0.127
t -0.371 -0.385
critical value 95% 2.262 2.262
critical value 99% 3.250 3.250
significance - -  
 
Correlation between DD and CDD 
DD Rank CDD Rank Difference DD Rank CDD Rank Difference 
Sector pre-GFC pre-GFC in rank2 GFC GFC in rank2
Automotive 7 7 0 10 10 0
Consumer Discretionary 5 6 1 9 9 0
Consumer Staples 3 4 1 2 2 0
Energy 4 2 4 7 8 1
Financials 6 9 9 11 11 0
Health Care 9 8 1 3 3 0
Industrials 2 3 1 4 4 0
IT 11 11 50 6 5 50
Materials 8 5 9 8 6 4
Telecomm. Services 10 10 0 1 1 0
Utilities 1 1 0 5 7 4
76 59
n 11 11
r 0.655 0.732
t 2.597 3.222
critical value 95% 2.262 2.262
critical value 99% 3.250 3.250
significance * *  
 
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient is a useful nonparametric measure for 
testing correlation when variables have been ranked, as it tests for relative changes 
between items rather than absolute numbers. Nonparametric tests are more suitable 
for smaller data sets where we are not making assumptions about distribution (for 
example where we are concerned about rankings rather than actual statistics such 
as means and standard deviations). In our case, we have a relatively small dataset 
as there are eleven variables and credit risk is often characterized by large losses in 
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the tail of the distribution rather than by normality. We are also not overly concerned 
with absolute numbers as we already know that the GFC period was riskier than pre-
GFC and we also already know that mathematically CDD will always exceed DD, so 
we are more interested with the performance of the automotive industry relative to 
other industries than in actual changes in numbers. The r value shown in the table 
above provides a correlation between -1 and 1, and the t value is compared to the 
critical value to determine the level of significance. 
 
The upper section of Table 4 shows that there is no significant association between 
those industries that were risky pre-GFC and those that were risky during the GFC. 
The lower section of  Table  4 confirms that there is some correlation between DD 
and CDD rankings, but only significant at a 95% level of confidence. We have also 
undertaken F tests, which measure changes in volatility, and these tests show that 
the increase in volatility experienced by the automotive industry is significantly higher 
than that experienced by the S&P Euro as a whole. Table 5 shows the individual 
automobile entity DD and CDD rankings both pre-GFC and during the GFC and the 
change in rankings is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Table 5: Automotive manufacturer DD and CDD 
DD (measured by number of standard deviations) is calculated using equation 1. CDD is based on the worst 5% 
of asset returns and is calculated using equation 4. Pre-GFC incorporates the 7 years to 2006. GFC includes 
2007 – 2009. Rankings are from 1 (lowest risk) to 10 (highest risk). Equity is measured as book value of 
shareholder funds to book value of total assets at 2009.  
 
 
  DD DD Rank Rank 
 
Equity  Pre-GFC GFC Pre-GFC GFC 
BMW 40.6% 6.42 6.46 2 1 
Daimler 54.7% 5.00 4.54 5 3 
Fiat 64.0% 5.44 5.09 4 2 
Peugeot 54.3% 6.45 2.87 1 5 
Renault 52.9% 4.57 2.49 6 6 
Volkswagen 57.8% 5.82 3.15 3 4 
 
53.8% 5.99 3.27     
      
 
  CDD CDD Rank Rank 
 
Equity Pre-GFC GFC Pre-GFC GFC 
BMW 40.6% 1.52 1.77 2 1 
Daimler 54.7% 1.20 1.07 5 3 
Fiat 64.0% 1.22 1.34 4 2 
Peugeot 54.3% 1.62 0.80 1 5 
Renault 52.9% 1.17 0.65 6 6 
Volkswagen 57.8% 1.45 0.81 3 4 
 
53.8% 1.44 0.85     
 
Both Peugeot and Renault suffered losses during the GFC and this, coupled with the 
difficulty in raising finance during the GFC, led to both requiring bailout packages 
from the French Government. These two manufacturers occupy the bottom two 
rankings on both a DD and CDD basis during the GFC. Peugeot, which was 
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operating well prior to the GFC, fell 5 rankings. Renault was ranked bottom both prior 
to and during the GFC, so the company showed no change in rankings.  
 
Figure 3: Automotive manufacturer ranking changes 
  
Volkswagen, who avoided losses during the GFC, nonetheless moved down two 
rankings, primarily because of increased volatility associated with the takeover bid 
triggered by Porsche. Up until mid 2008, Volkswagen’s volatility was among the 
lowest of the automotive manufacturers and increased substantially thereafter.  
BMW, Daimler and Fiat, who all experienced profitability problems during the GFC 
but not to the same extent as Renault and Peugeot, improved their rankings relative 
to the others. 
 
We see from Table 6 that there is no significant association between the individual 
company rankings pre-GFC and rankings during the GFC, meaning that those 
automotive companies that were most / least risky pre-GFC are not the same as 
those that were most / least risky during the GFC. As already discussed, this comes 
through ranking improvements by BMW, Daimler and Fiat, with deterioration by 
Peugeot and Volkswagen. Although there are large differences between absolute DD 
and CDD values in Table 6, these metrics are perfectly correlated in their ranking of 
the relative credit risk of the individual automobile companies.   
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Table 6: Correlation – automotive industry 
 
The upper table correlates pre-GFC rankings for the automotive industry with GFC rankings for both DD (on the 
left of the table) and CDD (on the right).  The lower table correlates DD rankings with CDD rankings for both 
the pre-GFC (on the left of the table) and CDD (on the right).  Rankings for both the upper and lower tables are 
taken from Table 3 and range from 1 (lowest risk) to 11 (highest risk). A negative change shows deterioration in 
risk ranking. A Spearman Rank Correlation Test is applied to determine correlation between the rankings. 
Significance in ranking correlation at the 95% level is denoted by * and at the 99% level by **, with a   ‘-‘   
indicating no significance. 
 
Correlation between pre-GFC and GFC 
DD Rank DD Rank Difference CDD Rank CDD Rank Difference 
pre-GFC GFC in rank2 pre-GFC GFC in rank2
BMW 2 1 1 2 1 1
Daimler 5 3 4 5 3 4
Fiat 4 2 4 4 2 4
Peugeot 1 5 16 1 5 16
Renault 6 6 0 6 6 0
Volkswagen 3 4 1 3 4 1
26 26
n 6 6
r 0.257 0.257
t 0.532 0.532
critical value 95% 2.776 2.776
critical value 99% 4.604 4.604
significance - -  
 
Correlation between DD and CDD 
DD Rank CDD Rank Difference DD Rank CDD Rank Difference 
pre-GFC pre-GFC in rank2 GFC GFC in rank2
BMW 2 2 0 1 1 0
Daimler 5 5 0 3 3 0
Fiat 4 4 0 2 2 0
Peugeot 1 1 0 5 5 0
Renault 6 6 0 6 6 0
Volkswagen 3 3 0 4 4 0
0 0
n 6 6
r 1.000 1.000
t null null
critical value 95% 2.776 2.776
critical value 99% 4.604 4.604
significance ** **  
 
We end this section with some final remarks on the findings, and how these relate to 
our hypotheses. The differences between the standard DD measures as captured by 
the Merton model and our unique CDD measures are highly significant (<1% using 
an F test for differences in volatility). The GFC DD measure of 3.27 has an 
associated PD of 0.05%, whereas the CDD of 0.85 has an associated PD of 29%. 
Given that two out of the six companies (33%) needed government bailout during this 
time and others suffered severe profitability problems, our CDD measure seems to 
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be far more realistic in its magnitude than DD. This is because our measure focuses 
on extreme tail risk, which is not adequately captured by the DD measure.  Overall, 
the rank correlation and F tests presented in this section have confirmed that, for 
both DD and CDD, relative risk between industries has changed for the GFC period 
as compared to pre-GFC, with automotive industry risk deteriorating relative to other 
industries, and supporting the following hypotheses as formulated in our 
methodology section: 
 
H1: Credit risk of the automotive industry, as measured by DD, deteriorated relative 
to other industries during the GFC as compared to pre-GFC. 
 
H2: Credit risk of the automotive industry, as measured by CDD, deteriorated relative 
to other industries during the GFC as compared to pre-GFC. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The study has shown that the credit risk of the automotive industry increased relative 
to other European industries during the GFC, with the industry shifting down three 
ranking positions. This supported our research hypotheses of deterioration in credit 
risk relative to other industries using both DD and CDD. These metrics showed the 
automotive industry  to have the second highest credit risk during the GFC, just 
behind the highly volatile financial industry over this period. Leading causes of this 
were consumers putting discretionary purchases on hold and a credit crunch which 
affected both the ability of consumers to raise motor vehicle finance and the ability of 
manufacturers to raise finance to bide them over this period. In particular, this 
increase in credit risk was evident among the French motor automotive companies of 
Peugeot and Renault, both requiring bailout from the French government.  
 
This high level of credit risk in the automotive industry has implications for lenders in 
considering portfolio composition and credit policies. Relative to most other 
industries, additional provisions and capital buffers will need to be held for the 
automotive  industry in downturn times.  Our CDD measure showed a much higher 
default likelihood that the traditional DD measure, and was more closely aligned than 
DD with the problems experienced by European automotive manufacturers during 
the GFC. This is due to CDD’s focus on default at the extreme loss end of the credit 
distribution, which is precisely when firms are most likely to fail. We therefore 
recommend CDD as a useful measure to lenders in assessing credit risk in dynamic 
economic circumstances. Potential further study on the automotive industry could 
involve analysis of the industry using our CDD metrics in other large automobile 
manufacturing regions such as Asia and the US, as well as associated entities such 
as automotive parts suppliers. The study also showed how the DD and CDD 
measures appeared far more responsive to dynamic economic circumstances than 
credit ratings, and it would be useful to further explore credit ratings as a measure of 
automotive industry credit risk in times of high volatility.     
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